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PROTECTING PATIENTS FROM THEIR BAD DECISIONS: REBALANCING RIGHTS, RELATIONSHIPS AND 
RISK 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in the Medical 
Law Review in November 2016 following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version 
is available at http://medlaw.oxfordjournals.org/ 
Abstract: 
Patients have a right to autonomy that encompasses making medical decisions that others consider 
‘bad’. The ambits of this right in law and clinical practice are explored in this article, which describes 
an expansion of welfare protections across different aspects of medical law and explores their 
justifications and implications. In England and Wales, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 sets out 
protections for those who fall within its definition of incapacity. Those who retain capacity are 
ostensibly free to make decisions others consider unwise. But the decisions of those with borderline 
capacity; those whose decisions conflict with the public interest in protecting the patient from harm; 
and those considered ‘vulnerable’ are, in circumstances explored in this article, susceptible to 
override. The article explores the effects of these developments on the relationship between 
patients’ autonomy rights and clinicians’ responsibilities.  
Keywords  
Autonomy; capacity; consent; necessity; paternalism; vulnerability 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The question at the heart of this article is: When should patients be protected from their ‘bad’ 
medical decisions? It focuses on changing legal conceptions of capacity and their effects in the 
context of clinical practice. Patients have not always had a meaningful role in the decision-making 
process. Patient autonomy has replaced the beneficence-model at the heart of ethical medical 
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practice,1 but the contested scope of autonomy and paternalism result in a precarious balance.2 One 
of the ways in which the law in England and Wales protects patient autonomy is by requiring 
informed consent.3 Doctors can be held liable in negligence if they fail to take reasonable steps to 
ensure that patients are aware of risks that are material to them.4 The validity of consent is 
governed by the law of battery. Consent must be ‘real’; that is, the patient must be informed in 
broad terms, voluntary and competent.5 These requirements impose duties on clinicians to protect 
and respect patient autonomy, but also restrict the powers of patients to consent where they are 
perceived to lack voluntariness or competence. The latter is governed by the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 and accompanying Code of Practice, which set out how to make health, welfare and financial 
decisions with or on behalf of adults aged 16 and over who are unable to achieve mental capacity. At 
the core of the Act are five principles, set out in section 1: 
(1) A person [‘P’] must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he lacks 
capacity. 
(2) A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all practicable steps to 
help him to do so have been taken without success. 
(3) A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an 
unwise decision. 
                                                          
1
 See Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [68] per Lords Kerr and Reed; [108] per Lady 
Hale. 
2
 F Freyenhagen, R O’Shea, ‘Hidden Substance: Mental Disorder as a Challenge to Normatively Neutral 
Accounts of Autonomy’ (2013) 9(1) IJLC 53. 
3
 The Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2936, reg 11; 
Montgomery [2015] UKSC 11, [87] per Lords Kerr and Reed. 
4
 Ibid, [108] per Lady Hale. 
5
 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432. 
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(4) An act done, or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of a person who lacks 
capacity must be done, or made, in his best interests. 
(5) Before the act is done, or the decision is made, regard must be had to whether the 
purpose for which it is needed can be as effectively achieved in a way that is less restrictive 
of the person's rights and freedom of action. 
The principles protect rights to autonomy (Principles 1-3) and liberty (Principle 5). Principle 4 sets 
out welfare considerations applicable to those who are unable to achieve mental capacity. This 
occurs when P satisfies the test for incapacity set out in sections 2(1) and 3(1) of the Act; namely 
that P (i) has an impairment or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain; and (ii) is unable 
to understand the relevant information, retain it, use or weigh it and communicate the decision. 
Where P lacks capacity, a best interests framework applies. Decisions are made on behalf of P 
according to a checklist set out in section 4 of the Act.  
For those with capacity, freedom to make medical decisions is fettered in a number of ways.6 
Restrictions in the public interest include possible detention of those with mental disorder under the 
Mental Health Act 1983 and, in the case of some infectious diseases, limitations on rights to 
confidentiality and of freedom of movement.7 There are also limits on the treatments patients can 
                                                          
6
 A detailed taxonomy is set out in R Huxtable, ‘Autonomy, Best Interests and the Public Interest: Treatment, 
No-Treatment and the Values of Medical Law' (2014) 22 Med LR 459. 
7
 Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, ss 35-38. More draconian powers may be available in a ‘public 
health emergency of international concern’. The WHO’s International Health Regulations 2005, Article 18(1) 
sets out provision for temporary recommendations that ‘require vaccination or other prophylaxis’. See also 
Article 23(4) requiring informed consent and exceptions set out in Article 32(2), ‘to the extent necessary to 
control a risk’. These measures are discussed in E Cave, ‘Voluntary vaccination: the pandemic effect’ (2016) LS 
forthcoming.  
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demand. There is no obligation to offer treatment that serves no therapeutic purpose8 and the NHS 
has limited resources that must be fairly allocated. Subject to these restrictions (which will not be 
further explored in this article), the law has traditionally upheld the rights of patients with capacity 
to decide, even when the decision will cause the patient harm9 and even when the decision is 
irrational.10 The position is neatly articulated by MacDonald J. in Kings College Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust v C and V:  
A capacitous individual is entitled to decide whether or not to accept medical treatment. The 
right to refuse treatment extends to declining treatment that would, if administered, save 
the life of the patient. … Within this context, where a patient refuses life saving medical 
treatment the court is only entitled to intervene in circumstances where the court is 
satisfied that the patient does not have the mental capacity to decide whether or not to 
accept or refuse such treatment.11 
As MacDonald J. asserts, the justification is the protection of autonomy rights: 
This position reflects the value that society places on personal autonomy in matters of 
medical treatment and the very long established right of the patient to choose to accept or 
refuse medical treatment from his or her doctor … . Over his or her own body and mind, the 
individual is sovereign (John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 1859).12 
                                                          
8
 See Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, [43] per Lady Hale: ‘A 
treatment may bring some benefit to the patient even though it has no effect upon the underlying disease or 
disability’. And see R (Burke) v GMC [2005] EWCA Civ 1003. 
9
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 1(4). 
10
 Re MB [1997] EWCA Civ 3039, [16]. 
11
 Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v C and V [2015] EWCOP 80, [1]-[3]. 
12
 Ibid. 
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The next section analyses recent developments that restrict the sovereignty of individuals to make 
what others perceive to be ‘bad’ medical decisions. I go on to contend that at the heart of these 
changes is a commitment in law to a modified form of autonomy rights accommodating both 
internal and external forces on the mind. Assumptions that the Mental Capacity Act comprised a 
complete civil law statutory code were flawed.13 I argue that law and professional guidance has 
developed to fill a lacuna that resulted from a predominantly procedural definition of mental 
capacity which inadequately protected those whose harmful decisions flowed from external forces 
such as undue influence. However, I warn that the developing legal recognition of autonomy poses 
dangers of paternalism that are accentuated by new laws on professional accountability for patient 
neglect. The developments have implications for the relationship between patient rights and 
professional practice, explored in the latter sections of the article. 
II. PROTECTING PATIENTS FROM ‘BAD’ DECISIONS 
This section explores three of the ways in which those who have mental capacity (as defined by the 
2005 Act) or are capable of its achievement might nonetheless be subjected to protections from 
their own decisions when the outcome threatens the individual’s life or health. In each case the 
Mental Capacity Act test for capacity is circumvented by a different mechanism: namely 
manipulation of the 2005 Act test for capacity; the establishment of an alternative test; and the 
overriding of a capacitous decision in the public interest. The first concerns borderline mental 
capacity. The subjective nature of the functional test for incapacity can lead to mislabelling a 
decision as incapacitated in order to afford the individual welfare protection. The second concerns 
those whose vulnerability is caused by reason other than mental incapacity. Doubt as to the 
exhaustive nature of the 2005 Act has recently been resolved, confirming the potential application 
of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court as a safety net to protect the vulnerable. Finally, this 
section considers the ambits of the public interest in protecting patients from serious harm when 
                                                          
13
 Expressly acknowledged in XCC v AA [2012] EWHC 2183 (COP), [52] per Parker J. 
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they attempt to restrict the disclosure of confidential information to third parties. I shall argue that 
the public interest defence to breach of confidentiality has expanded in response to the Mental 
Capacity Act’s restrictions of the best interest test to those lacking mental capacity. 
A. Allowing the Tail of Welfare to Wag the Dog of Capacity 
Where a patient makes a harmful decision about serious medical treatment, the 2005 Act provides 
that the assumption of capacity can only be rebutted on the basis of evidence of the individual’s 
impairment and understanding of the decision in question. The Act eschews an outcome-based or 
status-based test in favour of a functional test for incapacity. Nonetheless, there is a possibility that 
evidence of impairment combined with a harmful decision might in practice lead to a finding that an 
individual lacks mental capacity.  
This has been acknowledged in the Court of Protection. Peter Jackson J. in Heart of England NHS 
Foundation Trust v JB said:  
The temptation to base a judgment of a person’s capacity upon whether they seem to have 
made a good or bad decision, and in particular on whether they have accepted or rejected 
medical advice, is absolutely to be avoided. That would be to put the cart before the horse 
or, expressed another way, to allow the tail of welfare to wag the dog of capacity. Any 
tendency in this direction risks infringing the rights of that group of persons who, though 
vulnerable, are capable of making their own decisions.14 
There is scope within the law for discretion in the application of the section 3(1) functional test, 
which generates considerable debate regarding its correct interpretation (only referred to here in 
the briefest of terms). Section 3(1) states that a person is unable to make a decision if he cannot (i) 
comprehend the information, (ii) retain it (iii) use or weigh and (iv) communicate the decision. 
                                                          
14
 [2014] EWCOP 342, [7]. And see Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v C and V [2015] EWCOP 80. 
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Martin and Freyenhagen15 understand this to require a person with mental capacity to have five 
abilities (understand, retain, use, weigh, communicate) which will lead to more decisions being 
found incapacitous than would be the case if use and weigh were seen as synonyms or were 
required in the alternative. 
According to the Act, a best interests assessment should be reserved for those situations when the 
individual is incapable of achieving mental capacity. But it should be noted that section 4(4) of the 
2005 Act requires that the incapacitated individual participates in the decision and section 4(6) 
requires that best interests are determined in light of the individual’s past and present wishes and 
feelings, beliefs and values. In the Court of Protection, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities 2006 has enhanced protection of the autonomy interests of those lacking mental 
capacity. Article 12 protects the right to equal protection before the law, and to decision-making 
that reflects the will and preferences of the individual. Provided the individual is incapable of 
achieving capacity, this is a positive development. But there is a concern that it further blurs the line 
between capacity and incapacity. In Re CD Mostyn J. warned that: ‘it is vital that wishes and feelings 
are strictly confined to the best interests analysis and do not act subtly to undermine a capacity 
assessment.’16  
In clinical practice, the propensity for practitioners to decide that P lacks capacity on the basis that 
the decision is harmful, is well documented.17 Section 5 protects decision-makers from liability 
                                                          
15
 W Martin, F Freyenhagen, ‘Use or Weigh? Or Use and Weigh? A Note on the Logic of the MCA sec 3(1)’ 
Guest note in A Ruck Keene et al, Mental Capacity Law Newsletter December 2015: Issue 61, Court of 
Protection: Health, Welfare and Deprivation of Liberty. Online: http://www.39essex.com/content/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/MC-Newsletter-December-2015-HWDOL.pdf  
16
 [2015] EWCOP 74, [28]. 
17
 Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, Mental Capacity Act 2005: Post-Legislative Scrutiny, HL 
Paper 139, (March 2014), paras 56-58. 
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provided they have taken reasonable steps to establish that P lacks mental capacity. Williams et al 
refer to the ‘concertina effect’ where best interests and capacity assessments are conflated with the 
result that best interests determines whether or not an individual has capacity.18 Banner argues that 
the procedural legal test for mental capacity fits poorly with clinical reality where substantive 
elements may legitimately contribute to capacity assessment.19 In other words, the content of the 
decision may be relevant to the assessment of understanding. For example, the decision of a patient 
with anorexia nervosa to refuse food might be seen as evidence of an inability to use or weigh 
information about related treatment. In cases of borderline capacity there is therefore propensity in 
both law and practice to allow the outcome of an individual’s decision to affect the assessment of 
capacity.  
B. Vulnerability and the Inherent Jurisdiction 
The Mental Capacity Act focuses its protective regime on those incapable of achieving mental 
capacity, but recently an alternative route to protection for vulnerable individuals has been 
confirmed. Like the 2005 Act, this measure applies beyond the narrow focus of this article on 
patients making harmful medical decisions. Though the 2005 Act was designed as a ‘single 
comprehensive piece of legislation making provisions for people who lack capacity’,20 it did not 
explicitly deal with those unable to make a valid consent or refusal due to involuntariness. During 
the passage of the Act, plans for comprehensive legislation that would protect vulnerable people 
                                                          
18
 V Williams, G Boyle, M Jepson, P Swift, T Williamson, P Heslop, Making Best Interests Decisions: People and 
Processes (Mental Health Foundation, 2012), para 3.2. 
19
 NF Banner, ‘Can Procedural and Substantive Elements of Decision-Making be Reconciled in Assessments of 
Mental Capacity?’ (2013) 9(1) IJLC 71. 
20
 Law Commission, Mental Incapacity, LawComm (No 231, 1995), para 1.1. 
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were scaled down in light of the complexity of developing case law on the issues of undue influence 
and voluntary decision-making.21  
One of the ‘complex cases’ was the 1992 case of Re T (adult: refusal of treatment)22 in which a 20-
year-old woman who was 34 weeks pregnant was admitted to hospital having been injured in a car 
crash. After a private conversation with her mother, a Jehovah’s Witness, she signed a form refusing 
consent to blood transfusions. Her condition worsened, her child was still-born and T was 
transferred to the intensive care unit. On the basis of an application from her father and boyfriend, 
the Court of Appeal held that it would be lawful for the hospital to administer a life-sustaining blood 
transfusion.23 A distinction was drawn between incapacity and involuntariness which could, 
separately or in conjunction,24 justify overriding a patient’s decision.25 Incapacity could be the result 
of learning difficulties or mental illness, or of temporary factors such as pain, drugs or confusion.26 
Undue influence, on the other hand, could arise when the views of another acts so as to ‘overbear 
the independence of the patient’s decision’.27 In 1886, Sir James Hannen P. in Winqrove v Winqrove 
described undue influence as a form of coercion:  
The coercion may of course be of different kinds, it may be in the grossest form, such as actual 
confinement or violence, or a person in the last days or hours of life may have become so 
weak and feeble, that a very little pressure will be sufficient to bring about the desired result, 
and it may even be, that the mere talking to him at that stage of illness and pressing 
something upon him may so fatigue the brain, that the sick person may be induced, for 
                                                          
21
 HM Government, Making Decisions (Cm 4465, 1999), para 20.  
22
 [1992] EWCA Civ 18.  
23
 Ibid, [22]. 
24
 Ibid, [41] per Butler-Sloss L.J.. 
25
 Ibid, [22], [33] and [37]. 
26
 Ibid, [27] and [37]. 
27
 Ibid, per Lord Donaldson M.R., [31]: ‘In other words "Is it a decision expressed in form only, not in reality?"’. 
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quietness' sake, to do anything. This would equally be coercion, though not actual violence.28 
The Mental Capacity Act came into force 15 years after Re T. The accompanying Code of Practice 
made clear the need to guard against undue pressure.29 If the Act comprised a complete civil law 
statutory code, decisions of individuals could not be questioned outside its scope. But recently, the 
Court of Appeal confirmed in KC v City of Westminster Social and Community Services & Anor30 and 
then DL v A Local Authority & Others31 that capacity to make decisions can be overborne by 
circumstances other than those covered by the 2005 Act; The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court 
survives the passage of the 2005 Act.  
The facts of DL v A Local Authority & Others32 are these: A local authority applied to the court to 
protect two elderly people from their son, DL, who was exerting duress and undue influence upon 
them. Mr and Mrs L did not lack capacity under the 2005 Act but there were concerns that they 
were being pressured to move Mrs L into a care home and transfer ownership of their property to 
DL.  
The Court of Appeal held that Mr and Mrs L lacked the ability to make a decision by virtue of undue 
influence. McFarlane L.J., who gave the leading judgment, held that the inherent jurisdiction should 
be applied to enhance the autonomy of the vulnerable, maximising their opportunity to make a 
voluntary decision.33 The Court endorsed ‘a facilitative, rather than a dictatorial approach … which 
enhances, rather than breaches, their European Convention on Human Rights Article 8 rights’.34  
                                                          
28
 [1886] 11 PD 81 at page 82, cited in Re T (adult: refusal of treatment), ibid, [47]. 
29
 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice (TSO, 2007), para 2.8. 
30
 [2008] EWCA Civ 198, [12]. And see Local Authority X v MM & KM [2007] EWHC 2003 (Fam), [87], [111] and 
[167]. 
31
 [2012] EWCA Civ 253. 
32
 Ibid. And see KC v Westminster [2008] EWCA Civ 198. 
33
 See [2012] EWCA Civ 253, [54] and [66]. 
34
 Ibid, [67]. And see LBL v RYJ and VJ [2010] EWHC 2665 (COP), [62]. 
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Notwithstanding these safeguards, the decision is ground-breaking. As we have seen, the 2005 Act 
uses capacity (a fluid state) to determine competence (a legal state) with respect to a particular 
decision. DL affirms that an alternative form of ‘fluid state’ to that set out in the 2005 Act can impact 
on competence. I would contend therefore, that the inherent jurisdiction serves as an alternative 
route to incapacity: that ‘mental incapacity’ is governed by the 2005 Act and ‘common law 
incapacity’ by the inherent jurisdiction.  
Jonathan Herring welcomes the development arguing that: ‘The ability to intervene and make 
decisions will discriminate less on the grounds of whether a person has a mental disorder and enable 
the law to provide a set of protective mechanisms for those who lack autonomy’.35 There are 
however potential constitutional issues with this approach. Barbara Hewson argues that it 
‘represents an example of impermissible judicial law-making, which undermines the separation of 
powers’: 
In DL, we see judges taking protective measures by means of injunctions and … invoking the 
inherent jurisdiction as a justification. The problem is … courts allowing urgent claims for 
relief by those who are not, strictly, entitled to it. In seeking to protect adults who are not 
under a disability, the courts have crossed a line, which defines the ambit of their 
jurisdiction and powers.36  
The inherent jurisdiction is no doubt a powerful tool. It will apply to those who lack mental capacity 
under the 2005 Act so as to make available remedies not available under the Act.37 More pertinently 
for the purposes of this paper, it will also apply to vulnerable adults who are not found to lack 
mental capacity under the Act. As we shall see in section II.B below, the boundaries of the inherent 
jurisdiction are far from clear. The powers are not necessarily limited to injunctive relief and, as Re 
                                                          
35
 J Herring, Vulnerable Adults and the Law (OUP, 2016), 96. And see J Herring, K Wall, ‘Autonomy, Capacity 
and Vulnerable Adults: Filling the Gaps in the Mental Capacity Act’ (2015) 25(4) LS 698. 
36
 B Hewson, ‘’Neither Midwives Nor Rainmakers’ — why DL is Wrong’ [2013] PL 451. 
37
 XCC v AA [2012] EWHC 2183 (COP).  
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T38 makes clear, a finding of undue influence in the context of a medical treatment refusal can lead 
to that refusal being overridden and potentially to treatment without consent.  
C. Recognising a Public Interest in Protecting Patients from Harm  
This section highlights another example of the susceptibility of the test for capacity to be circumvented, 
this time where P’s decision conflicts with the public interest. Not all serious medical decisions involve 
treatment. Sometimes patients will be subjected to harm by virtue of their refusal to consent to 
disclosure of confidential information to a third party. This might occur when the clinician is presented 
with evidence of abuse or neglect. Where the patient lacks mental capacity, a decision can be made in 
their best interests in accordance with the 2005 Act. Even if the patient retains mental capacity, 
disclosure might be justified in the public interest if there is a risk of harm to others; to P’s children for 
example. More controversially, professional guidance recognises that the public interest may extend to 
protecting the individual adult from harm, despite their refusal to consent to disclosure.39 
The General Medical Council (GMC) recognises the rights of individuals with capacity to determine their 
own interests. This extends to decisions about disclosure of confidential information.40 But this is a right 
that is subject to the public interest, a concept broadly defined in law41 and articulated in more detail in 
                                                          
38
 [1992] EWCA Civ 18.  
39
 General Medical Council, Confidentiality (2009), para 51, ‘It may be appropriate to encourage patients to 
consent to disclosures you consider necessary for their protection and to warn them of the risk of refusing to 
consent, but you should usually abide by a competent adult’s refusal to consent to disclosure, even if their 
decision leaves them, but nobody else, at risk of serious harm’. (My italics). The General Medical Council, 
Confidentiality: Draft Guidance for Consultation (2015), paras 29 and 61 maintain this general position. 
Contrast with Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2016) para 14.94 which (citing 
BMA guidance) does not countenance disclosure to protect the individual with capacity from abuse or neglect, 
except where a criminal offence has occurred. 
40
 General Medical Council, Confidentiality (2009), para 51. 
41
 W v Egdell [1989] EWCA Civ 13. 
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professional guidance. Prior to the 2005 Act coming into force, GMC guidance recognised that the best 
interests test justified disclosure to protect a patient who lacked either mental capacity or 
voluntariness.42 As we have seen, the 2005 Act limits best interests assessments to those lacking mental 
capacity. The GMC responded in 2009 with new Confidentiality guidance outlining a broader public 
interest defence to capture those cases which previously would have fallen under the best interest 
framework.43 This blurring of the boundaries between the public interest test and best interest test can 
be linked to the limited scope of the 2005 Act to recognise that external forces on an individual’s will 
(such as undue influence) can lead to incapacity.44 The public interest involves a balancing exercise 
between the interests in disclosure and the interests in maintaining trust between health professionals 
and patients; any adverse effects of the disclosure on the autonomy and best interests of the individual 
are a relevant consideration. The public interest will therefore apply on a case by case basis, usually to 
prevent harm to others, but potentially to prevent harm to a patient with mental capacity. 
In other areas too, the public interest in protecting individuals from their harmful decisions is becoming 
increasingly pervasive. Section 42 of the Care Act 2014 creates a new legal duty incumbent on local 
authorities to make enquiries where they have reasonable cause to suspect that an adult in their 
area with care and support needs is at risk of abuse or neglect. Sections 6 requires ‘relevant 
partners’ such as NHS bodies to cooperate for a variety of purposes including ‘protecting adults with 
needs for care and support who are experiencing, or are at risk of, abuse or neglect’.45 Subject to 
this, the Care Act stops short of setting out legal powers to protect those with mental capacity against 
                                                          
42
 GMC, Confidentiality: Protecting and Providing Information (2000), paras 38-39. 
43
 General Medical Council, Confidentiality (2009), para 51. 
44
 E Cave, ‘Disclosure of Confidential Information to Protect the Patient: The Role of Legal Capacity in the 
Evolution of Professional Guidance’ (2015) 3(1-2) Journal of Medical Law and Ethics 7. 
45
 Care Act 2014, s 6(6). Note exceptions in s 7 where cooperation is incompatible with the relevant partner’s 
own duties or would adversely effect the exercise of its functions. 
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their will.46 But guidance recognises that incapacity can flow not only from impairment of the mind or 
brain as per the 2005 Act, but also from coercion, undue influence or duress and from a psychological 
process known as ‘Stockholm Syndrome’ where risk of harm can limit an individual’s capacity to 
safeguard themselves.47 The guidance embraces a conception of autonomy that moves beyond the 
largely procedural test set out in the 2005 Act.  
A more paternalistic emphasis permeates recent legal developments that could require professionals to 
report abuse or neglect, even in light of an individual’s objection. In England, mandated reporting by 
health professionals against the wishes of the individual concerned has, until recently, been resisted.  
A new approach emphasises the public interest in securing criminal prosecutions, even when it 
might conflict with the individual interests of the victim. There is a growing faction in support of 
broader mandatory reporting laws that aim, in part, to save victims from what might be considered 
involuntary decisions to reject intervention. The Serious Crime Act 2015 introduced mandatory 
reporting by regulated professionals (including health professionals) in England and Wales of female 
genital mutilation (FGM) where there are signs of FGM in children under the age of 18.48 A full public 
consultation on mandatory reporting and a duty to act was launched in July 2016.49 If supported, it is 
                                                          
46
 See Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance (2016), para 14.95. 
47
 Local Government Association and ADASS, Adult Safeguarding and Domestic Abuse: A Guide to Support 
Practitioners and Managers (2
nd
 ed, 2015), 24: ‘When a person who appears to have mental capacity also 
appears to be choosing to stay in a high-risk abusive relationship then careful consideration must be given to 
whether they are making that choice free from the undue influence of the person who is causing them harm or 
others.’ 
48
 The Serious Crime Act 2015, s 74 inserts a new section 5B into the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003. See 
Home Office, Mandatory Reporting of Female Genital Mutilation – Procedural Information (2015). 
49
 HM Government, Reporting and Acting on Child Abuse and Neglect: Government Consultation (21 July 2016). 
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likely to require primary legislation. Scotland and Wales already have laws in place requiring health 
professionals to pass on information in certain cases of abuse and neglect.50 
III. AUTONOMY AND THE LIMITS OF ACCEPTABLE PATERNALISM 
The previous section has identified ways in which patients might be protected from their ‘bad’ 
medical decisions whether by imposing protections in the public interest; on the basis of 
involuntariness; or in cases of borderline mental incapacity. This section analyses the changes 
through the lens of autonomy. It begins by examining the flaws of a procedural account of autonomy 
and goes on to recognise the effects of both internal and external forces on an individual’s will. The 
legal implications are set out and the subsequent section considers the implications in clinical 
practice.  
A. Procedural and Substantive Autonomy 
What constitutes a ‘bad’ medical treatment decision is a matter of context and perspective. Not only 
is it difficult in practice to make an objective assessment of what is good or bad for a patient, but the 
value to the patient of being the author of those decisions is contested.51 The will (or choice) theory 
                                                          
50
 Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014, s 106(1): ‘If a relevant partner of a local authority has 
reasonable cause to suspect that a person is an adult at risk and appears to be within the authority’s area, it 
must inform the local authority of that fact.’; Adult Support and Protection (Scotland) Act 2007, s 5(3): ‘Where 
a public body or office-holder to which this section applies knows or believes— (a) that a person is an adult at 
risk, and (b) that action needs to be taken (under this Part or otherwise) in order to protect that person from 
harm, the public body or office-holder must report the facts and circumstances of the case to the council for 
the area in which it considers the person to be.’ See also extensive mandatory reporting requirements in USA: 
Department of Health and Human Services, Children's Bureau, Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and 
Neglect (Washington, DC: U.S., 2016). 
51
 See J Coggon and J Miola, ‘Autonomy, Liberty and Medical Decision-Making’ (2011) 70(3) CLJ 523. 
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emphasises the safeguarding of individual autonomy52 and has been influential in the development 
of informed consent. It holds that the function of a right is to confer power on P to waive other 
people’s duties. A right therefore involves exercising choice in the performance of a duty by another 
person. The Mental Capacity Act is compatible with this theory insofar as it sets out a test to 
determine those incapable of ‘will’ (defined through the proxy of capacity) and the protections that 
might result. It also predominates in case law. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the 
right to information on material risks necessary to make an informed consent can be waived.53  
According to the interest (or benefit) theory on the other hand, commentators such as Raz and 
MacCormick argue that the function of a right is to improve P’s well-being by imposing duties on 
others. It is not the benefit that flows from the imposition of duty that makes P a rights-holder, but 
the fact that P’s right flows from the imposition of a duty that exists to serve his interests. Therefore 
a right can be waived only if it is in the interests of the right-holder to waive it. Acting against P’s will 
might harm P’s autonomy interests, but rights go beyond freedom of choice. Regardless of P’s legal 
capacity, rights cannot operate against P’s interests unless doing so will protect a more important 
interest of P’s or other persons. Conly argues that individual autonomy is not inviolable.54 Our 
capacity for irrational decision-making renders it important to limit the extent to which our choices 
are upheld when they do not further compliance with our own goals. ‘We should save people from 
doing things that are gravely bad for them when they do that only as a result of an error in 
thinking’.55 The interest theory of rights emphasises the role played by paternalism in protecting P’s 
interests, including P’s future choices. 
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Whether autonomy is instrumental or has meaning beyond the well-being it brings to P will affect 
the acceptable limits of paternalism. Paternalism is notoriously difficult to define. Many accept a 
differentiation between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ paternalism, but this too is subject to definitional 
quandaries. Hard paternalism can refer to the removal of choice through compulsion or coercion, 
whereas soft paternalism nudges or incentivises choice. An alternative sense of paternalism, more 
relevant to this paper, refers to the content of action. Accordingly, soft paternalism brings about 
action that P would have chosen if autonomous whereas hard paternalism imposes upon P a 
decision P does not will. Feinberg, in a refinement of Mill’s harm principle, argues that the state 
should not interfere with voluntary action that does not harm others. Soft paternalism on the other 
hand, will be justified where it needs to be determined whether the person is acting autonomously 
and voluntarily, such as treatment of P in a medical emergency, or if P is not acting voluntarily.56 
From a will theory perspective, hard paternalism is unjustified and whilst it is beyond the scope of 
this paper to set out a detailed defence of this position, it is clear that in the context of informed 
consent, it complies with the Mental Capacity Act and the Supreme Court’s assertion in Montgomery 
v Lanarkshire Health Board (Montgomery) that the doctor-patient relationship is no longer governed 
by a model of medical paternalism.57  
In 2007, John Coggon outlined three types of autonomy: ideal desire (what a patient should want), 
best desire (reflecting the patient’s values) and current desire (immediate inclinations). To treat P 
according to P’s ideal desire autonomy when P is capable of a decision reflecting best desire 
autonomy would reflect hard paternalism: a decision imposed on P against his will, in his best 
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interests. In the context of serious medical decisions, best desire autonomy - incorporating both 
procedural and substantive elements - is considered more robust, but the law has traditionally 
adopted a less sophisticated formation, more akin to the current desire autonomy formulation: 
On the whole, judges talk of autonomy as being equivalent to self-determination. In English 
medical law, this allows patients to refuse any medical treatment or intervention, and to 
choose one of any treatments offered by a medical professional.58 
There is a potential dichotomy between the Mental Capacity Act definition of incapacity and an 
expression of P’s best desire autonomy. From a will theory perspective this raises the possibility that 
the law might uphold a harmful decision that is not truly willed and from an interest theory 
perspective the Act might recognise someone as having capacity even if they do not fulfil what Raz 
recognises as three essential requirements for autonomy: ‘appropriate mental abilities, an adequate 
range of options, and independence’.59 Both would consider that an unwilled harmful decision is 
capable of infringing P’s rights.  
As we have seen in section II.A above, the subjective nature of the test for mental incapacity results 
in cases of borderline capacity. Those who fall within this ‘grey area’ may be susceptible to a finding 
of incapacity if their decision would cause them harm. In other words, there is a risk of hard 
paternalism. The test for incapacity attempts to limit uncertainty by adopting a predominantly 
procedural conception of autonomy. Whether P makes a decision reflecting current or best desire 
autonomy is largely an empirical question.60 Section 2(1) sets a diagnostic threshold for mental 
incapacity. Evidence of an inability to make a decision (as set out in section 3) is not on its own 
enough to establish incapacity. The diagnostic threshold renders the functional approach of the Act 
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more robust and enhances protection of free choice by distancing legal capacity from rational 
autonomy. The Act requires that those lacking mental capacity must be helped to achieve it61 and, 
where this proves impossible, have their views and wishes taken into consideration. Those with 
mental capacity gain from the Act a zone of freedom to choose. According to section 1(4), ‘A person 
is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise decision’. The 
Act does not require the decision to be rational or even considered.62 The test is thus predominantly 
procedural though there are at least two senses in which substantive elements are present. First, by 
requiring that capacity is promoted and facilitated, the Act and Code of Practice might be said to 
subtly endorse a more substantive version of autonomy.63 Second, the section 3(1)(c) requirement 
that P is able to ‘use or weigh’ the information requires an assessment of P’s ability to balance and 
consider the information. But these aspects relate largely to the process of decision-making rather 
than the content of the decision. The binary test for mental capacity creates a stark distinction 
between those who have capacity (and with it a right to make the decision in question) and those 
who do not. The presumption that those with mental capacity are capable of protecting their own 
interests is (tacitly, given that the Act focuses on those lacking capacity) at the core of the Mental 
Capacity Act. This is so even if, in fact, the individual’s decision does not reflect best desire 
autonomy – that is, it is not an authentic decision, consistent with the person’s values. 
There is evidence that aspects of the law are moving toward an approach that is more reflective of 
the promotion of best desire autonomy. This might serve both to explain and impose limitations on 
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the expansive approach to protecting patients from harmful decisions, described in section II above. 
In particular, it is contended that commitment to a will theory conception that underlies the 2005 
Act - and thus the avoidance of hard paternalism – should guide the development and limitation of 
attempts to reach a more nuanced and sensitive set of protections for those incapable of a best 
desire autonomous decision.  
Commitment to a more substantive concept of autonomy is evident in the Supreme Court decision 
of Montgomery,64 which consigned Sidaway v Royal Bethlem Hospital65 to the history books and 
confirmed that patients consenting to treatment must be given information that a reasonable 
person in the patient’s position would want to know. The decision confirms the role of the law of 
negligence in protecting patients’ autonomy,66 including ‘freedom to decide what shall and shall not 
be done with their body’.67 The doctor must engage in dialogue, tailored to the needs of the 
individual.68 Lady Hale stated:  
Most decisions about medical care are not simple yes/no answers. There are choices to be 
made, arguments for and against each of the options to be considered, and sufficient 
information must be given so that this can be done.69  
The decision promotes autonomy by requiring health professionals to provide the necessary 
information to give the patient the opportunity to make a decision reflecting best desire autonomy. 
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In their joint judgment, Lords Kerr and Reed recognise that a patient can decide not to be so 
informed. This is not incompatible with best desire autonomy, particularly where the information 
would cause harm. More problematic is recognition of a limited ‘therapeutic exception’ by which 
health professionals may withhold material information from the patient if disclosure might cause 
serious harm.70 To the extent that it is used to protect patients from specific information that will 
render them unable to make a decision (for example because of the fear it will induce) it is not 
necessarily incompatible with best desire autonomy, but there is potential for the exception to be 
applied more paternalistically, so as to subvert P’s will to avoid P suffering serious harm.71 Subject to 
this concern, the decision in Montgomery endorses a more substantive version of informed consent. 
It reduces emphasis on the ‘flak jacket’ approach which views consent as a health professional’s 
defence to battery and focuses instead on consent as the chief means of safeguarding patient 
autonomy.72 With the opportunity for decision-making reflecting best desires comes responsibility 
for the choices made:  
[S]ocial and legal developments … point towards … an approach to the law which, instead of 
treating patients as placing themselves in the hands of their doctors (and then being prone 
to sue their doctors in the event of a disappointing outcome), treats them so far as possible 
as adults who are capable of understanding that medical treatment is uncertain of success 
                                                          
70
 See ibid, [85]. 
71
 I explore these issues in a forthcoming paper entitled ‘The ill-informed: consent to medical treatment and 
the therapeutic exception’. 
72
 K Keywood, ‘The Death of Sidaway: Values, Judgments and Informed Consent’ BMJ Blogs, (15 March 2015). 
Online: http://blogs.bmj.com/medical-ethics/2015/03/15/the-death-of-sidaway-values-judgments-and-
informed-consent/ 
22 
 
and may involve risks, accepting responsibility for the taking of risks affecting their own lives, 
and living with the consequences of their choices.73  
In establishing enhanced duties of doctors to provide patients with information and the 
corresponding patient responsibility for their decisions, I would submit that the decision in 
Montgomery represents a shift away from unfettered freedom of choice toward responsible (best 
desire) decision-making. Patients are seen as rights holders and ‘consumers exercising choices’.74 
Post-Montgomery, we might expect greater rigour in the information routinely provided to patients. 
There may be a correlating increase in the complexity of the information,75 potentially resulting in more 
individuals falling within section 3 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and being found to lack mental 
capacity. The section 3(2) duty to explain information in a way that is appropriate to the individual will 
become increasingly important. The focus in Montgomery on providing patients with the requisite 
information to make an autonomous decision and the corresponding responsibility this confers on the 
patient creates a clearer distinction between those able and unable to take responsibility for their 
decisions. The Supreme Court in Montgomery embraced a substantive version of autonomy in the law 
of negligence that contrasts with the predominantly procedural approach taken in the 2005 Act. 
Similarly, the inherent jurisdiction encompasses substantive autonomy in its recognition of both internal 
and external forces on a person’s will, at least to the extent that the courts attempt to limit the harms 
that flow to patients whose decisions reflect their current desires but are neither authentic nor 
consistent with the individual’s overall desire. It is to this matter that we now turn. 
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B. Internal and External Forces 
Recognition of both procedural and substantive aspects of capacity is enhanced by the recent 
confirmation of the ‘safety net’ provided by the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. By focusing 
on internal forces that affect capacity, the Mental Capacity Act failed to adequately protect those 
unable to make a decision by virtue of external forces that might flow, for example, from abuse, 
undue influence or neglect – at least in those cases where the inability to make a decision does not 
satisfy section 2(1). To establish mental incapacity, the inability to decide must be ‘because of’ an 
impairment of the mind or brain.76 Whilst it may be possible to establish mental incapacity where 
undue influence is a factor but impairment is the operative cause of the inability to decide,77 this will 
not be possible where undue influence is the sole cause. And yet, the protection of those who 
cannot be empowered to make autonomous treatment decisions is at the core of the mischief the 
Act intended to address.78  
Aristotle distinguished involuntariness from non-voluntariness. The latter may be brought about by 
internal forces. The emphasis in the Mental Capacity Act definition of incapacity on a therapeutic 
threshold and the effect of this internal force on the individual accords with this conception. But 
Aristotle79 also recognised that voluntariness can be affected by external forces which can be used to 
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compel a person and deny them control. In an Aristotelian sense, a voluntary act is one which we bring 
about ourselves. An act is not voluntary if it is brought about by physical or psychological external forces 
or is caused by (as opposed to done in) ignorance. Policy considerations dictate the extent to which 
different areas of law hold or depart from this conceptualisation. The law of negligence, for example, 
focuses on conduct not state of mind. The standard of care will not take into account subjective 
personal characteristics (except in the case of children) even if they point to the defendant’s 
incapacity.80 By way of contrast, in the Chancery Division, evidence of benefit to a stronger party in a 
transaction will raise a presumption of involuntariness. Consider Hart v Burbidge,81 where a lifetime 
gift from a mother to her daughter and son-in-law raised a presumption of undue influence when 
other relatives would have inherited the property under the terms of her will.  
What of medical treatment? The central role of voluntariness in the law of consent is undisputed. 
Consent is only valid it if is voluntary.82 But the law on consent can only go so far in its protection of 
those incapable of making a voluntary decision. A patient who is treated without a valid consent can 
bring a claim in battery against the doctor. But the law on consent alone cannot protect those whose 
refusals of treatment are involuntary.  
C. A Facilitative Approach? 
Recognition that the inherent jurisdiction survives the passage of the Mental Capacity Act makes 
clear the relevance of external as well as internal forces on a person’s will and might enhance 
protection of best desire autonomy over free choice. In so doing, the decision in DL represents a 
measured approach protective of welfare rights, but facilitative of autonomy rights. A facilitative 
role implies that any restrictions must be placed on third parties so as to enable P’s unencumbered 
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decision-making. Indeed McFarlane L.J. endorsed the approach taken in LBL v RYJ and VJ83 where 
Macur J. said:  
I reject what appears to have been the initial contention of this local authority that the 
inherent jurisdiction of the court may be used in the case of a capacitous adult to impose a 
decision upon him/her whether as to welfare or finance. … [T]he relevant case law 
establishes the ability of the court, via its inherent jurisdiction, to facilitate the process of 
unencumbered decision-making by those who they have determined have capacity free of 
external pressure or physical restraint in making those decisions. 
In the context of medical treatment decisions, however, reliance in DL on Re T84 and dicta supporting 
the availability of the inherent jurisdiction beyond cases of ‘borderline [mental] incapacity’,85 suggest 
that evidence of undue influence might justify treatment against the expressed wishes of an 
individual, particularly in the case of an acute illness requiring one-off treatment, such as occurred in 
Re T.86 Imagine, for example a patient whose refusal of treatment for a broken jaw is found to be 
involuntary due to abuse of a relative. The patient has mental capacity but is vulnerable and has 
welfare needs that could be protected through a best interest decision requiring medical treatment. 
A facilitative approach would take time to implement at considerable detriment to the health of the 
patient. Would a welfare-based approach requiring treatment be justified as necessary and 
proportionate? Such a decision might be justifiable on the basis that the patient’s harmful decision 
was not autonomous.87 This sub-section explores the potential for the law to impose treatment 
decisions on P under the inherent jurisdiction and considers the risks this poses of hard paternalism. 
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The aim is to emphasise the importance of clarifying the extent of the court’s powers. As we shall 
see in the next section, a failure to do so could lead to defensive practices flowing from enhanced 
professional accountability.  
The significance of the decision in DL88 goes beyond the narrow confines of its facts. First, the 
potential for the inherent jurisdiction to be used to bring about decisions that conform to the judge’s 
idea of a ‘good’ decision, is surely great. Nothing will demonstrate that voluntariness has been 
facilitated more than a decision that accords with the health interests of the individual. Second, the 
inherent jurisdiction is not limited to cases of involuntariness. Post-Re T the ambits of the inherent 
jurisdiction were expanded in Re G (An Adult), Re SA (Vulnerable Adult with Capacity: Marriage) and 
Re SK.89 In DL, McFarlane L.J. stated that: 
The jurisdiction is … aimed at enhancing or liberating the autonomy of a vulnerable adult 
whose autonomy has been compromised by a reason other than mental incapacity because 
they are (to adopt the list in paragraph 77 of Re SA): a) Under constraint; or b) Subject to 
coercion or undue influence; or c) For some other reason deprived of the capacity to make 
the relevant decision or disabled from making a free choice, or incapacitated or disabled 
from giving or expressing a real and genuine consent.90 
The autonomy-enhancing inherent jurisdiction effectively asserts a common law route to incapacity 
that might flow from: ‘deception, misinformation, physical disability, illness, weakness (physical, 
mental or moral), tiredness, shock, fatigue, depression, pain or drugs. No doubt there are others.’91 
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Third, there are questions as to the extent of the powers of the ‘great safety net’92 which forms the 
inherent jurisdiction. A number of developments indicate that they are broad. For example, the 
inherent jurisdiction has transcended jurisdictional boundaries, applying in the case of a vulnerable 
British citizen habitually resident in Saudi Arabia;93 and to recognise orders made by the Irish High 
Court allowing emergency treatment for eating disorder.94 Additionally, in XCC v AA it was 
established that the court can make orders of its own initiative (even if they have not been raised by 
the parties to the case).95 In the same case, the High Court made clear that it is not restricted by the 
terms of the Mental Capacity Act: Parker J. held that in place of the principle of least restriction in 
section 1(6) of the 2005 Act, orders of the court under the inherent jurisdiction must simply be 
‘necessary and proportionate’.96   
Munby J. in Re SA refers to the ‘largely unfettered jurisdiction to grant appropriate injunctive relief'97 
stating: 
More generally, … the court has the power to make whatever orders and to give whatever 
directions are needed to ascertain the true wishes of a vulnerable adult or to ascertain 
whether a vulnerable adult is able to exercise her free will or is confined, controlled, coerced 
or under restraint.98 
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Might the powers extend beyond injunctive relief?99  In DL, McFarlane L.J. recognised that the 
exercise of the inherent jurisdiction is not limited to interim relief (for example to give P space to 
exercise free will).100  Furthermore, Parker J. in Norfolk County Council v PB101 (obiter) saw ‘no 
indication that the inherent jurisdiction is limited to injunctive relief’.102 Though PB had mental 
capacity under the 2005 Act to decide where to live, a ‘residence requirement’ could be imposed on 
her under the inherent jurisdiction, provided the aim was to ‘protect, liberate and enhance personal 
autonomy’103 and the order was necessary and proportionate. As Ruck Keene has argued: 
[W]hilst Parker J. was at pains to identify the approach that she was suggesting as being 
supportive of PB’s autonomy, it is perhaps not impertinent to suggest that it is very unlikely 
… that PB would regard this as being the case. There is a distinct flavour here of forcing an 
individual to be free.104 
In Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust v RC, Mostyn J. set out the wide powers of the court: 
There are three circumstances where adult citizens may have treatment or other measures 
imposed on them without their consent. i) Adults lacking capacity … may have treatment 
forced upon them in their best interests pursuant to the terms of the MCA. ii) Similarly, 
adults who have capacity but who can be categorised as ‘vulnerable’ and who as a 
consequence of their vulnerability have been robbed of the ability to give a true consent to a 
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certain course of action, may also have treatment or other measures imposed on them in 
their best interests pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court … iii) Under the 
Mental Health Act 1983 a detained patient may have treatment imposed on him or her 
pursuant to section 63 …105 
This not only conflates the consequences of involuntariness and mental incapacity but Mostyn J. also 
refers expressly to the power to impose treatment on P. Nonetheless, the approach of the courts is 
likely to be cautious. Emphasis on facilitation in DL suggests, as Parker J. recognised in XCC v AA, that 
‘in contrast to incapacitated adults, the decisions of adults with capacity cannot be overridden on 
the best interests test or welfare grounds’. 106  A cautious approach is also evident in the case of Re 
FD (inherent jurisdiction: power of arrest)107 where Judge Bellamy made a distinction between the 
power to make orders and the power to enforce them,108 acknowledging that the powers of the 
inherent jurisdiction do not extend to attaching powers of arrest to an injunction.109  
Furthermore, Regulation 11 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 
2014110 requires that ‘care and treatment of service users must only be provided with the consent of 
the relevant person’. Regulation 11(3) sets out the exceptions to this rule including situations where 
‘the service user is 16 or over and is unable to give such consent because they lack capacity to do so’, 
in which case the registered person must act in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005. 
Reference to the 2005 Act might seem to preclude extension of the inherent jurisdiction beyond a 
facilitative role. One might conclude that welfare-based decisions requiring treatment are prohibited 
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on the basis that Regulation 11(3) refers to those lacking capacity (and not those who are 
vulnerable) and to the Mental Capacity Act (and not the common law).  
On the other hand, I have argued that P can be said to ‘lack capacity’ to consent if their decision is 
found at common law to be involuntary. Provided the inherent jurisdiction is styled as an alternative 
route to incapacity, it could be argued that treatment decisions fall within the 11(3) exception. Nor is 
the reference to the 2005 Act in Regulation 11(3) necessarily problematic. McFarlane L.J. has made 
clear that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court is compatible with the Mental Capacity Act.111 
Decision-makers can act in accordance with the Act even though their decisions are not expressly 
contemplated in the legislation. The common law protects those with capacity from treatment 
without consent,112 but this protection is susceptible to changes in the definitions of capacity, 
through statutory interpretation of the 2005 Act test or development of the inherent jurisdiction. 
Acceptance of the argument that the inherent jurisdiction can incorporate best interest decision-
making is not necessarily incompatible with Regulation 11(3).  
Consider A NHS Trust v Dr A.113 Dr A was a patient with psychosis on hunger strike in protest at a 
decision made by the UK Border Agency. Dr A could not be treated (force-fed) under the Mental 
Health Act because it was for a physical rather than mental disorder;114 and though he lacked 
capacity, he could not be deprived of his liberty under the 2005 Act because he was detained under 
the Mental Health Act.115 Baker J. confirmed that the inherent jurisdiction is not limited to those who 
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are vulnerable for reasons other than mental incapacity.116 He made an order authorising treatment 
and deprivation of liberty which, he held, is within the powers of the inherent jurisdiction providing 
it complies with Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.117 In conclusion, where 
there are questions about the voluntary nature of a refusal of treatment there is a blurred line 
between a facilitative approach and one which focuses on broader welfare considerations. By 
limiting the force of the patient’s (involuntary) decision, the court might facilitate a future 
autonomous decision, but in the interim any medical treatment imposed in the individual’s best 
interests would be, in a very real sense, dictatorial. Furthermore, the extent of the powers of the 
inherent jurisdiction is still unclear. Graeme Laurie and Ken Mason have eloquently argued for 
greater articulation of the Court’s powers and this is particularly necessary insofar as they may be 
used not merely to facilitate choice but to make decisions on P’s behalf.118  
This section has described legal developments around the principle of autonomy that move away 
from a simplistic articulation of capacity as freedom of choice on the basis that it fails to adequately 
protect vulnerable patients. In its place is an increasingly sophisticated concept of autonomy which 
promotes best desire autonomy and protects those who are vulnerable by virtue of their inability to 
take responsibility for their decisions. I have set out justifications for this approach but also sounded 
notes of caution. The dearth of case law outlining the powers of the court; its extension to measures 
imposing treatment on P; and the lack of cases specifically on the application of the jurisdiction in 
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relation to serious medical decisions creates potential for hard paternalism. This has important 
implications for practice which I explore in the next section.  
IV PATIENT RIGHTS AND PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
A. Professional Accountability 
Doctors must now have in mind the potential not only for mental incapacity under the 2005 Act, but 
also for common law incapacity borne of involuntariness. Developments regarding professional 
accountability amplify the effects of these changes. Where traditionally the scope and extent of health 
professionals’ duties depended on the group status of the individual, the emphasis is increasingly on P’s 
characteristics and vulnerabilities. Mental incapacity – and now also common law incapacity resulting 
from involuntariness - have crucial roles to play in defining the ambits of doctors’ and providers’ 
responsibilities.  
Enhanced professional accountability flows in part from high profile scandals demonstrating all too 
clearly that poor standards of care render all patients vulnerable, regardless of their capacity for 
decision-making.119 The Francis Inquiry Report in 2013 responded to serious failures in care at Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust between 2005 to 2008.120 The 290 recommendations addressing 
systemic deficiencies and a lack of effective governance were largely accepted by Government.121 As 
we shall see, the report prefaced an era of enhanced accountability and transparency122 that 
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enhances the duty of health professionals and providers to act, potentially in a manner that is 
contrary to the current desires of the patient.  
In particular, three recent legislative changes emphasise improving patient safety and delivering 
safeguarding according to need.123 First, the Health and Social Care (Safety and Quality) Act 2015124 
imposes an obligation on the Secretary of State (and the powers to make relevant regulations) to ensure 
that no avoidable harm is caused to service users. The Act sets out fundamental standards to be met 
by health professionals. Second, the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) 
Regulations 2014 set out the requirements that all providers must meet in order to be registered 
with the Care Quality Commission. Regulation 13 requires that service users are safeguarded from 
abuse and improper treatment. They must be protected by adequate systems and processes125 and 
care must not be provided in a way that discriminates against individuals ‘on grounds of any 
protected characteristic (as defined in section 4 of the Equality Act 2010)’.126 Service users must be 
protected from ‘abuse’, which incorporates sexual offences, physical and psychological ill-treatment 
and neglect.127 According to Regulation 22, an offence is committed128 where breach leads to 
physical or psychological avoidable harm to a service user or exposure to the service user of a 
significant risk of such harm occurring. Finally, sections 20-25 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 
2015 create an offence of ill treatment or wilful neglect that applies to health professionals. The 
offence covers conduct by all paid care workers in a healthcare setting. The outcome of the conduct 
is irrelevant – no harm need be proved. What matters is the culpability of the care worker. The 
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legislation is expected to yield up to 240 prosecutions per annum.129 These legislative changes 
represent significantly enhanced accountability of professionals and an expanding duty to act.  
Prior to the 2015 Act, statutory duties to avoid wilful neglect focused on patients who were deemed 
vulnerable by virtue of their status. Protections extended to children, those with mental disorder 
and those with mental incapacity.130 In the context of the Mental Capacity Act, ill treatment or wilful 
neglect of a person lacking or reasonably believed to lack mental capacity is an offence under 
section 44 of the 2005 Act. As Mandelstram points out, prosecutions under section 44 are rare, 
though neglect – and persistent recklessness - is not.131 Since 2015 statutory protections extend to 
all patients, whether or not they have capacity. This is not to say that incapacity is irrelevant. A 
finding of incapacity (whether mental incapacity or common law incapacity) could in certain 
circumstances be indicative of a duty to act to prevent potential harm to the patient.  
Could a health professional who failed to act in contravention of an individual’s harmful refusal of 
treatment be found guilty of neglect if there was clear evidence of mental incapacity or 
involuntariness? There is no case in point, but the 2015 Act is designed to enhance accountability. 
Pre-2015 case law does not preclude such a finding. In the context of child cruelty, ‘wilful’ neglect 
has incorporated recklessness. In R v Sheppard132 the House of Lords held that a failure to provide 
medical attention for a child was ‘wilful’ if the defendant knew there was a risk that the child’s 
health would suffer without medical attention or did not care whether or not the child was in need 
of medical attention. A broad view of the definition of ‘wilful neglect’ was also taken by the Court of 
Appeal in the context of section 44 of the Mental Capacity Act in the 2013 case of R v Parulben 
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Patel.133 The defendant was convicted even though her omissions (the failure to administer CPR) 
were the result of panic and stress.  
It is possible that a doctor who accepted a refusal of treatment from a patient who lacked capacity 
at common law due to involuntariness might be found guilty of wilful neglect if it could be shown 
that the doctor acted recklessly. Let us imagine that a patient refuses a recommended round of 
chemotherapy under pressure from a relative; or refuses treatment for fractured ribs by command 
of an abusive partner. Provided the abuse does not operate as an ‘impairment of the mind or brain’ 
sufficient to satisfy the diagnostic threshold in section 2(1) of the 2005 Act, an argument might be 
made that conforming with the expressed will of these patients constitutes neglect if the doctor 
ought reasonably to have approached the High Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in order to 
facilitate a voluntary decision. As has been argued above, it is conceivable that the High Court would 
make a best interest decision if treatment were necessary and proportionate and removal of the 
coercive force would not bring about a voluntary decision in time to prevent significant harm.  
The Criminal Justice and Courts 2015 Act is unlikely to lead to a rash of prosecutions against doctors 
who comply with harmful patient treatment refusals despite their lack of mental capacity or 
voluntariness. It might, however, lead to greater caution and defensiveness and thus to a greater 
willingness to apply a best interests framework if the patient might reasonably be said to lack mental 
capacity (in other words, in cases of borderline mental capacity); or to applications to the High Court 
where there are questions as to the voluntariness of the decision or the vulnerability of the patient.  
Regulation 13 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014 
exacerbates this prospect. It sets out penalties against providers for neglect that falls short of 
‘wilful’. In light of the 2014 Regulations, providers are likely to encourage health professionals to 
more readily view P as statutorily incapacitated where P’s decision would otherwise cause P harm, in 
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order to avoid potential liability. After all, Section 5 of the 2005 Act provides that where a proper 
assessment of mental capacity and best interests is made, the health professional will not incur 
liability for acting without the consent of a patient reasonably thought to lack capacity. If the 2014 
Regulations result in a risk-averse approach to mental capacity assessments, there is potential to 
undermine efforts to counteract the poor implementation of the presumption of mental capacity 
outlined by the Select Committee and referred to below.134  
In conclusion, health professionals and providers who fail to approach the court to exercise its 
inherent jurisdiction when faced with patients making involuntary decisions to refuse treatment, 
might fear liability for neglect under the 2014 Regulations or even wilful neglect under the 2015 Act. 
In time this may lead to an increase in cases to the High Court or exacerbate recourse to findings of 
incapacity under the 2005 Act in cases of doubt.  
B. Necessity 
The safety net operated by the High Court through its inherent jurisdiction poses a number of legal 
and practical problems. At a judicial level, there is pressure on the courts to ensure that protections 
are equal whether the source of incapacity is external or internal.135 For patients, reliance on the 
High Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction is problematic for a number of reasons including the 
associated costs, timeliness and bureaucracy; and the risk that only the most extreme cases will 
reach the courts. For clinicians, enhanced professional accountability may necessitate change. The 
inherent jurisdiction presents to clinicians a means to protect vulnerable patients that was not 
thought previously to exist. Clinicians must be aware of its existence and consider bringing relevant 
cases before the High Court, even if this means questioning a patient’s decision to refuse treatment.  
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Must the clinician bring each case before the court? Prior to the Mental Capacity Act coming into 
force doctors relied on the common law doctrine of necessity.136 In Re F (mental patient: 
sterilisation)137 the House of Lords invoked the defence of necessity to what would otherwise have 
constituted a battery in the case of sterilisation in the best interests of a person unable to provide 
consent. Lord Donaldson warned:  
The ability of the ordinary adult patient to exercise a free choice in deciding whether to 
accept or to refuse medical treatment and to choose between treatments is not to be 
dismissed as desirable but inessential. It is a crucial factor in relation to all medical 
treatment.138 
The defence as set out in Re F is broad, encompassing actions to save life and improve or prevent 
deterioration in health.139 Section 5 of the Mental Capacity Act created a narrower, general defence 
to those acting in P’s best interests on the basis of a reasonable belief that P lacks mental capacity. It 
seems that the common law defence of necessity has no application where the Mental Capacity Act 
applies,140 and nor would section 5 apply if the patient retained mental capacity but lacked 
voluntariness. There is no general defence of necessity:141 Is Re F good law post-Mental Capacity 
Act? The defence of necessity has been ruled inapplicable as a defence to assisted suicide under 
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section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961142 and to the criminal use of cannabis to alleviate suffering,143 but 
recognition that the inherent jurisdiction survives the 2005 Act supports the argument that the 
doctrine of necessity also maintains relevance. As such, this reopens a dilemma described by 
Straughton L.J. in Re T: 
The notion that consent or refusal of consent may not be a true consent or refusal presents 
a serious problem for doctors [particularly where] … the choice is, as in this case, between 
[(a) no decision and (b) refusal of consent]. The surgeon will be liable in damages if he 
operates when there is a valid refusal of consent, and liable in damages if he fails to operate 
in accordance with the principle of necessity when there was no valid decision by the 
patient. … Some will say that, when there is doubt whether an apparent refusal of consent is 
valid in circumstances of urgent necessity, the decision of a doctor acting in good faith ought 
to be conclusive. … However, I cannot find authority that the decision of a doctor as to the 
existence or refusal of consent is sufficient protection, if the law subsequently decides 
otherwise. So the medical profession, in the future as in the past, must bear the 
responsibility unless it is possible to obtain a decision from the courts.144 
Until further guidance is handed down from the courts, the responsibility is onerous. Given academic 
concerns over judicial law-making in DL,145 the extent of the powers of the inherent jurisdiction and 
the dangers posed to patient autonomy rights and interests, the courts would rightly be reluctant to 
delegate broad powers to doctors to make best interests decisions on behalf of patients who make 
involuntary decisions. Nor is it likely that doctors would seek such onerous responsibility. To date a 
restrictive view of any duty to act on the basis of necessity has been taken, at least with respect to 
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local authorities.146 However, in the event of a significant increase in applications to court, 
articulation of clinicians’ powers under the doctrine of necessity might be considered prudent. One 
possibility would be to restrict the defence of necessity to those situations where there is a duty to 
act to prevent neglect of the patient.147 The new laws on wilful neglect by doctors and neglect by 
providers could be utilised to carve out a limited sphere in which doctors might be expected to 
intervene to prevent potential harm to a patient making an involuntary treatment refusal. Only in 
these rare cases would a doctor be justified in acting without the consent of the patient or the court. 
The cases could be restricted to emergency situations and to cases where the doctor is unable to 
facilitate an unencumbered decision in time to avoid risk of serious harm. Carefully framed, such a 
development would generally take the decision away from the courts and extend to doctors the 
power and responsibilities they currently exercise in relation to patients with mental incapacity. 
There would be greater equity between decisions that are not autonomous because the decision-
maker lacks mental capacity or voluntariness. If the combined effects of enhanced professional 
accountability and the potentially broad ambit of the inherent jurisdiction lead to an increase of 
cases to the High Court, this option presents a possible mechanism to enhance access to justice 
whilst limiting the potential scope of medical paternalism.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has charted legal developments that enhance protection of individuals from their ‘bad’ 
medical decision-making and considered the implications for healthcare practitioners. What 
constitutes a challengeable ‘bad’ decision was ostensibly controlled by the Mental Capacity Act 
2005, which applies a functional test to determine incapacity. Where the test for incapacity is not 
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satisfied then the decision is, subject to a number of exceptions, left to the individual, no matter 
how bizarre or irrational others may find it.148 The emphasis is on free choice rather than 
autonomous choice. In 2011 Coggon and Miola criticised legal developments perpetuating this 
approach in the context of information disclosure on the ground that it misrepresented what 
constitutes patient ‘choice’.149  Since then, legal developments analysed in this article have tackled 
the potential for the bright line approach that dominates the 2005 Act to harm the interests of 
vulnerable people. The scope of a ‘bad’ and challengeable decision is now subject to a range of 
different approaches, which I have assessed through a consideration of the principle of autonomy. 
The 2005 Act incorporates health, financial and welfare decisions but this article has focused on 
medical treatment decisions which raise special issues not least because of their potentially serious 
nature but also because of their intersection with the wider body of jurisprudence on informed 
consent and potentially wide-ranging impacts on clinical practice which flow from recent expansions 
of professional accountability.  
The focus has been on three developments in particular. First, paternalistic protections have in 
practice been extended to those with borderline mental capacity, thus allowing ‘the tail of welfare to 
wag the dog of capacity’ (to use the Peter Jackson J.’s phrase). In 2014, the Select Committee 
pointed to poor implementation of the 2005 Act.150 Since then, emphasis has been on improving 
awareness of its core principles. Second, the High Court has developed the inherent jurisdiction to 
protect those making involuntary decisions. I have explored the likely ambits of these powers in 
relation to medical treatment decisions, including the potential to move beyond injunctive relief to 
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make dictatorial decisions and to incorporate deprivations of liberty.151 Third, the article has 
documented an expansion of the public interest in protecting individuals from harm in law and 
professional guidance on confidentiality.  
When these developments are analysed through the lens of autonomy, they can be understood as 
attempts to add substance to the predominantly procedural account of autonomy inherent in the 
2005 Act. The 2015 Supreme Court decision of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board152 
emphasises responsibility as a component of autonomy. But there are cases when an individual with 
mental capacity cannot take responsibility for their decision, for example, when their decision is a 
result of undue influence. Both external and internal forces can affect an individual’s will. Failure to 
recognise this in law would be to uphold certain involuntary decisions. Such cases will be few: Many 
involuntary decisions will satisfy the statutory test for mental incapacity. Even capacitous decisions 
to consent are protected where they are involuntary because the law of consent would render them 
invalid.153 Patients would not, however, be adequately protected from the harmful effects of their 
involuntary treatment refusals. The developing inherent jurisdiction potentially operates as an 
important safety net in this regard.154  
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This approach is not without risk. Insofar as the 2005 Act respects current desire decisions of those 
who are not found to lack capacity, the Act upholds free choice. The challenge for the increasingly 
nuanced legal approach to decision-making capacity outlined in this article is to resist the pull from a 
model focussed on ‘best desire’ autonomy to one which reflects ‘ideal desires’. The 2005 Act 
provides guiding principles and McFarlane L.J. warned in DL that care must be taken to ensure that 
in exercising the inherent jurisdiction the court does not subvert the will of Parliament.155 As we 
have seen, Regulation 11(3)of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 
2014 also imposes limitations on the situations in which treatment without P’s consent is legally 
permissible. But ultimately, commitment to human rights - and Articles 5 and 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in particular-  is needed to mitigate the risks of a gradual slide toward 
hard paternalism. In X v Finland156 it was made clear that compulsory medical treatment must be 
subject to procedural and substantive safeguards in order to be Article 8 compliant.  
What is required of domestic law is a symbiotic development of law and practice to fill the lacuna in 
the 2005 Act’s protection of vulnerable people whilst upholding the principle that anyone capable of 
making an autonomous decision is able (and, if necessary, facilitated) to do so. Commitment to this 
aim requires that cases of borderline mental capacity are resolved in strict accordance with the Act; 
that development of common law capacity develops in line with the 2005 Act; and that further 
expansion of the ‘public interest’ defence to confidentiality in order to protect individuals from harm 
is constrained lest it restrict those capable of making a decision from doing so.  
I have suggested that the risks of hard paternalism are particularly strong in clinical practice where 
the assessment of (in)capacity is increasingly complex and the extension of liability for neglect has 
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potential to lead to defensive practices whereby patients may be said to lack capacity on the basis of 
their vulnerability. There is a risk that in preference to approaching the High Court to exercise its 
inherent jurisdiction, some practitioners will make assessments of mental incapacity that are not 
truly justified. This in turn risks exacerbating the well-documented problems associated with 
implementing the 2005 Act. If, on the other hand, the number of applications to the High Court rises, 
I have suggested that the judiciary might look to the doctrine of necessity to justify medical 
treatment that preserves life or prevents significant harm where there is doubt that a treatment 
refusal is voluntary, and suggested novel ways in which it might be controlled. Given the complex 
intersection of the various legal developments at the point of clinical practice, much emphasis will 
be placed on professional guidance and the court’s articulation of the powers and application of the 
inherent jurisdiction as the new common law route to incapacity develops.  
